This paper proposes an innovative data-fusion/ data-mining game theoretic situation awareness and impact assessment approach for cyber network defense. Alerts generated by Intrusion Detection Sensors (IDSs) or Intrusion Prevention Sensors (IPSs) are fed into the data refinement (Level 0) and object assessment (L1) data fusion components. High-level situation/threat assessment (L2/L3) data fusion based on Markov game model and Hierarchical Entity Aggregation (HEA) are proposed to refine the primitive prediction generated by adaptive feature/pattern recognition and capture new unknown features. A Markov (Stochastic) game method is used to estimate the belief of each possible cyber attack pattern. Game theory captures the nature of cyber conflicts: determination of the attacking-force strategies is tightly coupled to determination of the defense-force strategies and vice versa. Also, Markov game theory deals with uncertainty and incompleteness of available information. A software tool is developed to demonstrate the performance of the high level information fusion for cyber network defense situation and a simulation example shows the enhanced understating of cyber-network defense.
game trees. For example (see Fig. 1 ), red side (attacker) has five options while blue side (IDS) has two re-actions for information-set 1 (two blue bullets labeled as 1:1) about sub-system 1 and three possible actions for information-set 2 (three blue bullets labeled as 1:2) about sub-system 2 and 3. The payoffs of both sides are shown on the right side of each possible outcome (black bullets). A mixed Nash Strategy pair is shown with black lines. Attacker will choose action "Attack Sub-system 1" with probability 3/20, "Attack Sub-system 2" with probability 3/20, and "Do not attack subsystem 2/3" with probability 7/10. Blue side will set an alarm for sub-system 1 with probability 1, sub-system 2 with probability 5/12, sub-system 3 with probability 47/90, and ignore with probability 11/180. It is not difficult to see that these matrix game models lack the sophistication to study multi-players with relatively large actions spaces, and large planning horizons.
In this paper, we develop a highly innovative data fusion with data mining framework for cyber defense based on advanced knowledge infrastructure and Markov (Stochastic) game theory. The framework itself can be applied to multiple domains from urban warfare to cyber attack. In this framework, a decentralized Markov game is used to model the evolution of Enemy Course of Actions (ECOAs) originating from an initial prediction generated by pattern recognition. Our approach has several features:
1) Decentralized. Each cluster or team of
IDSs makes decisions mostly based on the local information. We put more autonomies in each group allowing for more flexibility;
2) Markov Decision Process (MDP) can effectively model uncertainties in the cyber network environment;
3) Game framework is an effective and ideal model to capture the nature of network conflicts: the determination of one side's strategies is tightly coupled to that of the other side's strategies and vice versa; 4) Neutral players: white (neutral) objects (normal network nodes) are modeled as one of the multi-players so that their possible COA will be estimated and considered by the other players.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our proposed framework. Section 3 presents a Markov model for cyber network defense. Section 4 and 5 discuss the simulation tool and simulation result.
FRAMEWORK FOR CYBER SITUATION AWARENESS
We propose an information fusion based decision and control framework (Fig. 2 ) to detect and predict the multistage stealthy cyber attacks.
Our cyberspace security system has two fully coupled major parts: 1) Data fusion module (to refine primitive awareness and assessment, and to identify new cyber attacks); and 2) Dynamic/adaptive feature recognition module (to generate primitive estimations, and to learn new identified new or unknown cyber attacks).
Various logs and alerts generated by Intrusion Detection Sensors (IDSs) or Intrusion Prevention Sensors (IPSs) are fed into the L1 data fusion components. The fused objects and related pedigree information are used by a feature/pattern recognition module to generate primitive prediction of intents of cyber attackers. If the observed features are already associated with adversary intents, we can easily obtain them by pattern recognition. In some time-critical applications, the primitive prediction can be used before it is refined; because the high-level data fusion refinement operation is relatively time-consuming in the multiplicative of probability calculations. High-level (L2 and L3) data fusion based on Markov game model is proposed to refine the primitive prediction generated in stage 1 and capture new or unknown cyber attacks. The Markov (Stochastic) game method (MGM) is used to estimate the belief of each possible cyber attack graph. Game theory can capture the nature of cyber conflicts: the determination of the attacking-force strategies is tightly coupled to the determination of the defense-force strategies and vice versa. Also MGM can deal with the uncertainty and incompleteness of the available information. We propose a graphical model to represent the structure and evolution of the above-mentioned Markov game model so that we can efficiently solve the graphical game problem.
The captured unknown or new cyber attack patterns will be associated to related L1 results in the dynamic learning block, which takes deception reasoning, trend/variation identification, and distribution models and calculations into account. Our approach to deception detection is heavily based on the application of pattern recognition techniques to detect and diagnose what we call out-of-normal (anomaly) conditions in the cyber environment. The results of dynamic learning or refinement shall also be used to enhance L2 and L3 data fusion. This adaptive process may be considered as level 4 data fusion (process refinement; see the 2004 DFIG model [11] ).
In this paper, we will focus on the Level 3 data fusion part in the overall framework shown in Fig. 2. 
MARKOV GAME MODEL FOR CYBER NETWORK DEFENSE
To address the cyber network security problem from a system control and decision perspective, we present a Markov game model [4] . In general, a Markov (stochastic) game is specified by (i) a finite set of players N, (ii) a set of states S, . For the cyber decision support and attacker intent inference problem, we obtain the following distributed discrete time Markov game (we revise the Markov game model [5] used for battle-space and focus on the cyber attack domain properties):
Players (Decision Makers) ---Cyber attackers, network defense system, and normal network users are players of this Markov game model. We denote cyber attackers as red team, network defense system (IDSs, Firewalls, Email-Filters, Encryption) as blue team, normal network user as white team. The cooperation within the same team is also modeled so that the coordinated cyber network attacks can be captured and predicted.
State Space ---All the possible states of involved network nodes consist of the state space. For example, the web-server (IP = 26.134.3.125) is controlled by attackers. To determine the optimal IDS deployment, we include the defense status for each network nodes in the state space. So for the i th network node, there is a state vector s
where f is the working status of the i th network node, p is the protection status, T is the transpose operator, and a is the status of being attacked. "Normal" and "malfunction" are typical values of f with the meaning that the node is in the normal working status or malfunction (Recall that in battle space cases, the function status of any unit values can be "undestroyed", "damaged", or "destroyed"). p can be the defense unit/service (such as firewall, IDS and filter, with Awareness and Impact Assessment probability) assigned to the node and p = NULL means that the i th node is unprotected. a is the status of being attacked. The type of attacks will be specified in Action Space. Remark 1: It is not difficult to understand that the system states are determined by two factors: 1) previous states and 2) the current actions. So the whole system can be model by a first-order Markov decision process.
The overall system state at time k is
where M is the number of nodes in the involved cyber network.
Action Space ---At every time step, each player chooses targets with associated actions based on its local network information. For normal network users, the action types are http services, email services, ftp services, etc. The actiondecision control of the i th white player at time k is
where vector t is the network node providing services and v is the service type requested. (We assume that the normal users know the server/service in advance). [Note: we use u for action decisions because action decisions typically are determined as utility functions with the higher payoff]
For red team (cyber network attackers), we consider the following types of network-based attacks:
• Buffer overflow (web attack): it occurs when a program does not check to make sure the data it is putting into a space will actually fit into that space. Vulnerability exists in Microsoft IIS 5.0 running on Windows 2000 that allows a remote intruder to run arbitrary codes on the victim machine, allowing them to gain complete administrative control of the machine. Apache HTTP Server version 1.3.19 could allow a remote attacker to send an HTTP request to cause the server to crash with unexpected behavior.
• Semantic URL attack (web attack): In semantic URL attack, a client manually adjusts the parameters of its request by maintaining the URL's syntax but altering its semantic meaning. This attack is primarily used against CGI driven websites. A similar attack involving web browser cookies is commonly referred to as cookie poisoning.
• E-mail Bombing (email attack): In Internet usage, an e-mail bomb is a form of net abuse consisting of sending huge volumes of e-mail to an address in an attempt to overflow the mailbox or overwhelm the server. The possible re-action is to identify the source of the email bomb/spam and configure your router (or have your Network Service Provider configure the router) to prevent incoming packets from that address.
• E-mail spam (email attack): Spamming is the abuse of electronic messaging systems to send unsolicited, undesired bulk messages. Spammers often collect addresses of prospective recipients from use-net postings or from web pages, obtain them from databases, or simply guess them by using common names and domains. By popular definition, spam occurs without the permission of the recipients.
• MALware attachment (email attack): Malware is software designed to infiltrate or damage a computer system without the owner's informed consent. It is a blend of the words "malicious" and "software". Common MALware attacks are worms, viruses, trojan horses, etc.
• Denial-of-service (network attack): Denial-of-service (DoS) attack is an attempt to make a computer resource unavailable to its intended users. Typically the targets are high-profile web servers where the attack is aiming to cause the hosted web pages to be unavailable on the Internet. A distributed denial of service attack (DDoS) occurs when multiple compromised systems flood the bandwidth or resources of a targeted system, usually a web server(s). These systems are compromised by attackers using a variety of methods. Remark 2: Some attacks may be multi-stage. For example, e-mail spam and MALware are used first to gain control of several temporal network nodes, which are usually not-well protected servers. Then DoS attack will be triggered to a specified and ultimate target. Our dynamic Markov game model can handle these attacks from a planning perspective. Our mixed Nash strategy pair is based on a fixed finite planning horizon. See Strategies for details.
For the blue team (network defense system), we consider the following defense actions:
• IDS deployment: we assume that there are limited IDSs. IDS deployment is similar to resource allocation (target selection) problems in traditional battle-space situations. We try to find an optimal deployment strategy to maximize the chance of detecting all possible cyber network intrusions.
• Firewall configuration: A firewall is an information technology (IT) security device which is configured to permit, deny or proxy data connections set and configured by the organization's security policy. Firewalls can either be hardware and/or software based.
• Email-filter configuration: Email filtering is the processing of e-mail to organize it according to specified criteria. Most often this refers to the automatic processing of incoming messages, but the term also applies to the intervention of human intelligence in addition to artificial intelligence, and to outgoing emails as well as those being received. Email filtering software inputs email and for its output, it might (a) pass the message through unchanged for delivery to the user's mailbox, (b) redirect the message for delivery elsewhere, or (c) throw the message away. Some e-mail filters are able to edit messages during processing.
• Shut down or reset servers.
Transition Rule ---The objective of the transition rule is to calculate the probability distribution over the state space
are the overall decisions of the blue team (network defense system), the red team (cyber attackers) and the white team (normal network users), respectively, at time step k. How to decide the overall actions for each team are specified in Strategies.
For each network node (server or workstation), the state of time k+1 is determined by three things: 1) state at time k; 2) control strategies of the three teams; and 3) the attack/defense efficiency. If we compare part 3) to battle-space domain, the efficiency is the analogue of kill probability of weapons.
For example, if the state of node 1 at time k is ["normal", "NULL", "NULL"], one component of the red action is "email-bombing node 1", one component of blue action is "email-filter -configuration-no-block for node 1", and all white actions are not related to node 1, then the probability distribution of all possible next states of node 1 is: ["normal", "email-filter-configuration", "email-bombing"] with probability 0.4; ["slow response", "email-filterconfiguration", "email-bombing"] with probability 0.3; and ["crashed", "email-filter-configuration", "email-bombing"] with probability 0.3. The actual probabilities depend on the efficiency of attacking and defending actions.
Payoff Functions ---In our proposed decentralized Markov game model, there are two levels of payoff functions for each team (red, blue, or white): lower (cooperative within each team) level and higher (non-cooperative between teams) level payoff functions. This hierarchical structure is important to model the coordinated cyber network attacks and specify optimal coordinated network defense strategies and IDS deployment.
The lower level payoff functions are used by each team (blue, red or white side) to determine the cooperative team actions for each team member based on the available local information. For the j th unit of blue force, the payoff function at time k is defined as ( )
is the local information obtained by the j th blue member,
is the action taken by the blue team member at time k, and ( ) B W k , the weights for all possible action-target couples of blue force, is announced to all blue team members and determined according to the top level payoff functions from a team-optimal perspective.
where, ( )
is the utility or payoff of the current local network state. Usually, it is a negative value if a network node is in malfunction status due to a cyber attack. The specific value depends on the value of the network node. The counterpart in the battle-space domain is the target value of each platform. Function ( )
will calculate the weight for any specified action decision for the j th member of the blue team based on the received Similarly, we obtain the lower level payoff functions for the j th member of red and white team,
Remark 3: It is well known that non-neutral civilians often play an active role in wars. That is, they are not just passively static but might purposefully take actions to help one side in a battle to minimize their losses or achieve some political purpose. Unfortunately, existing game theoretic models usually do not consider this situation, although collateral damage has been considered in a paper on a two-player game model by Cruz et al [6] . In this research, a three-player dynamic game model is formulated, in which two opposing forces and one normal player that might be either neutral or slightly biased [7] . In our current implementation, the white units only care about their possible losses. For an example, when a slower or malfunctioned network node is detected, normal network users will find a COA to keep themselves as far as possible from the node. In addition, there may be no cooperation between the white team members, so we can simply set
Remark 4:
In some instances of the use of game theory for military applications by others, it is almost always the case that zero-sum game theory is used. In zero-sum game theory, the players have opposite objectives. If one player maximizes an objective function, the other automatically minimizes it. This is equivalent to a player maximizing an objective function and the other player maximizing the negative of the same function. Since the sum of the objective functions is zero, the game is called a zero-sum game. But for the cyber network attack scenario, we propose a non-zerosum game model for the following two reasons: 1) there are three players as mentioned in Remark 4; 2) even in the case without a white player, there are some cases the objective of attacking side and defense side are not opposite of each other. For example, the hackers may be deterred from any attacking actions by well-protected defense systems. In this case, payoffs of both sides decrease, which is conflicting the zero-sum assumption. So we model the cyber network attack and defense system as a non-zero-sum dynamic Markov game.
The top level payoff functions at time k are used to evaluate the overall performance of each team.
( )
In our approach, the lower lever payoffs are calculated distributedly by each team member and sent back to network administrator via communication networks.
Strategies ---In game theory, the Nash equilibrium (named after John Nash [8] who proposed it) is a kind of optimal collective strategy in a game involving two or more players, where no player has anything to gain by changing only his or her own strategy. If each player has chosen a strategy and no player can benefit by changing his or her strategy while the other players keep theirs unchanged, then the current set of strategy choices and the corresponding payoffs constitute a Nash equilibrium.
A mixed strategy is used in game theory to describe a strategy comprised of possible actions and an associated probability, which corresponds to how frequently the action is chosen. Mixed strategy Nash equilibria (NE) are equilibria where at least one player is playing a mixed strategy. It was proved by Nash that that every finite game has a Nash equilibria but not all has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. While computing his mixed NE strategy, each player pays attention only to the average payoff functions.
In our cyber network security application, mixed Nash strategies are preferred since the existence is guaranteed. In addition, the stochastic property of mixed Nash strategy is compatible to the Markov (stochastic) game model. Playing a mixed strategy can also keep your opponent off balance. The worst case payoff of a mixed strategy may be better than the worst case payoff of a pure strategy.
In our proposed approach, the solution to the Markov game is obtained via a K time-step look-ahead approach, in which we only optimize the solution in the K time-step horizon. K usually takes 2, 3, 4, or 5. The suboptimal technique is used successfully for reasoning in games such as chess, backgammon and monopoly. For our case, the objective of each team at time k is to find a serial of actions or COA to maximize the following team level payoffs, respectively,
Remark 5: The K-step look-ahead (or moving window) approach well fits the situations in which multi-step cyber network attacks occurs since we evaluate the performance of each team based on the sum of payoffs during a period of K-time steps.
SIMULATION AND VISUALIZATION TOOL
To evaluate our game theoretic approach for cyber attack prediction and mitigation, we have constructed a Cyber Game Simulation Platform (CGSP) based on an open-source network experiment specification and visualization tool kit (ESVT).
[ESVT] Through this event-based, interactive and visual simulation environment, various attack strategies (single stage or multistaged) and scenarios can be easily played out and the effect of game theoretic attack prediction and mitigation can be visually and quantitatively evaluated. Fig.3 is a snapshot of the CGSP environment.
The implemented network components in this platform includes Computer (host), Switch, OSPF Router or Firewall, Link (connection), and (Sub) Network (Simulated by a node).
Besides the ordinary network properties such as processing capacity, bandwidth, and delay etc., CGSP components can be assigned a number of network attack containment or traffic mitigation properties to act as various defense roles, including smart IDS (intrusion detection systems), incoming traffic block, and outgoing traffic block. Additionally and Fig.3 Cyber Game Simulation Platform (CGSP) more importantly, these defense roles or network defense properties can be deployed and re-deployed on the fly during a game simulation run-time based on the local intelligence and orders from higher-level command centers.
The color of a link represents the traffic volume on that link (in KBps and in Mbps).
• Light Gray: less than 1 percent of bandwidth
• Green: more than 1 percent of bandwidth
• Yellow: between green and red
• Red: more than 30 percent of bandwidth
The color of a host indicates the host status.
• Red: Infected node.
• Green: Vulnerable node but not infected
• Gray: Non-vulnerable node Some features of the CGSP include,
• An integrated environment to plan and specify interactive network simulation experiments. At the first step, it can be used to draw the network topology and specify component properties such as susceptibility, server, or non-server, etc. Users can also change the properties of a group of components or all components by invoking the global component and script property configuration window. The topology builder is designed to be scalable and can support large topologies with thousands of components. There is no hard limit on the size of the virtual canvas and the display can be smoothly zoomed in and zoomed out to accommodate editing operation on a large topology.
• Network protocol neutral: Network packets and their communication are simulated by high-level event objects
and their movement across various components. Specific network protocol details are ignored. We ignore many such technological details so we can focus on attack scenario construction and defense strategies. Preliminary emulation experiments have shown that such network protocol neutral simulation yields a relatively high fidelity.
• Event driven simulation. It means to represent and organize network dynamics by events in a network environment and trace all the events. A running event may trigger a new event to be generated. So every step of simulation is to let all the events to be finished if they can finish. Event driven is complemented by object driven since some host will generate new events even when there is no triggering event on the host (For example, during a worm break or a infected host participating in a DoS attack). We define a step of network simulation, which means a non-interruptible time period of the simulation.
• "What you see is what is happening" style visualization based simulation. Visualization shows clear advantages in helping network and security researchers understand and make sense of the network dynamics from their experimental results and the CGSP environment is built on this principle. The GUI updates network component and their security status every second and component properties can be inspected and modified interactively during the simulation. Simulation can also be suspended, resumed, and adjusted with respect to running speed.
• Multiple entries for user intervention. Experimenters can inject various attack scenarios or defense actions in advance by using the "Timed Event" feature. During the simulation run-time, experimenters can also modify component properties or insert diagnostic or experimental events into the simulation through the graphical user interface. In addition, with the advancements in real-time assessment, user action and cognition can utilize Level 5 fusion (user refinement) [11] to refine high-level understanding of events, detect conflicts, and prioritize nodes for additional details of possible intrusions, attacks, and malicious cyber behavior.
• For router simulation, if we use Dijkstra's Algorithm [12] , then we have to generate a table for every router.
Dijkstra's single-source shortest-path algorithm computes all shortest paths from a single vertex. But the storage of such table in every node wastes valuable computer resources. Another algorithm is called Floyd's all-pairs shortest-path algorithm, or the Floyd-Warshall All-Pairs-Shortest-Path algorithm. It solves all the shortest paths in the same step. We use this algorithm to get the "shortest path" [13] .
I
In our simulation platform, network attacks and defenses are simulated in CGSP by events. Live network packets and other communications are represented and simulated by the main network event queue. Users or software agents can inject packets or network events through the timed event (M/M/1) queue. Security alerts or logs are generated and stored in the security log queue.
There are a number of cyber attacks that are included in the CGSP implementation: Port scan, Buffer attack (to gain control), Data bomb or Email bomb from and to a single host, Distributed Denial of service from multiple hosts, Worm attack, and Root right hack (confidentiality loss). [Note: Both buffer attack victims and worm infectives will join the distributed denial of service when they receive the DDOS command.]
The arsenal of network defense team includes: Smart IDS (Accuracy and false positive adjustable), Directional traffic block (outgoing or incoming), Host Shutdown, Host Reset (shutdown and restart). [Note: Both SHUTDOWN and RESET will clear the infection status on the host.]
The following level one security logs are generated: Port Scan log, Buffer attack log, Hacked host log, Worm log, Data bomb log, and DoS log.
EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
We simulated three typical scenarios. In the first scenario as shown in Fig. 4 , there are 7 computers, 3 routers, 2 switches, and 1 normal outside network: Since the network defense side can reset the computers anytime, we can see from the simulation (screen captured movie file scenario1.avi -available upon request) that no servers or target computers are infected or hacked.
In a more complicated scenario 2 as shown in Fig. 3 , there are 23 computers, 2 routers, 7 switches, and 1 network. In this scenario, we disable the operation of resetting infected or hacked computers in the action space of cyber network defense side. We can see from Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 that a target computer (web server) is infected or hacked. Then the computer (web server) will be used by attacking force to infect other more important target computers such as file servers or email servers. This two-step attacking scheme is based on two facts: 1) a public web server is easy to attack and 2) an infected internal computer (web server in this case) is more efficient and stealthy than an external computer to attack well protected computers such as data servers or email servers. To test the scalability of our approach, we also simulated a relatively complicated case in the third scenario (Fig. 7) , in which 269 computers, 10 routers, and 18 switches are included. From the simulation (screen captured movie file scenario1.avi -available upon request), we can see that the simulation is slower than the previous two scenarios due to the increased computing work. Fortunately, the intelligent interactions between two sides are well simulated and demonstrated based on our Markov game model.
CONCLUSIONS
We implemented high level information-fusion/data-mining based situation awareness and adversary intent inference in a cyber attack and network defense scenario. The network security system was evaluated and protected from a perspective of data fusion and adaptive control. The goal of our approach was to examine the estimation of network states and projection of attack activities (similar to ECOA in the warfare scenario). We used Markov game theory's ability to "step ahead" to infer possible adversary attack patterns. Extensive simulations were performed to verify and illustrate the benefits of this model. The performance of our algorithm was very promising.
